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The Effects of Top Management Team External Ties and Board 
Composition on the Strategic Choice of Late Movers 
lae Wook Yoo, Richard Reed 
Introduction 
Ever since Berle <lnd Means (1932) discussed the sep.aration of ownership and management in the ~modem corporation,M 
it has been accepted that the role of the board of dieMors is to act as fiduciaries for the owners. As such. shareholders have 
entrusted the board to monitor and control managers to minimize agency problems. Arguably, that trustwas misplaced. After 
the problems of misleading financial disclosures which erupted in the late 19905 and earty 2000s (Winreki. 2007). and 
following arguments that have long been made in the governance literarure(Fam<l. 1980: F.lma JndJensel1, 1983: Jensen .lnd 
MC',kling, 1976). there were calls by stock~e)(change offidals to increase the Rumberof outsiders on bo.lrds and to s~parat~ th~ 
rol~s of CEO and chairman. Despit~ th~ soundness of the theoretical argum~nts which link both of thos~ actions with 
improved d~cision-tTh1king and cons~qu~nt firm perrormanc~, empirical r~search has not produced clear suppOrt for eith~r 
(D.ll ton er .11.. 1998: Golden and Z.ljac. 2001; Lmgevoon. 2001). Methodological issu~s aside, thatoutcom~ lik~ly refl~crs the 
fact that the res~arch has focused on main effects, rather than digging more deeply into behavioral and interactive effects 
between the board and tOP managers (D.lily et al .. 2003). 
Judge ,lnd Zeirhaml (1992) found that boards could be involved in th~ process of formulating strategic decisions, and 
Westphal (1999) showed how boards couki influenc~ SlTategic decis ion-making through advice-giving interactions with 
CEOs (please also s~e O'Neal ,llid Thom,n, 1999; Westph,ll and Fredrickson, 2001: Wn. 2008~ Mort re<~n{ research has 
focused on the idea of collaboration berween the board ;lRd manag~ment in deciding strat~gy {e.g" Hemlry er at. 2010; Zh.1llg 
cot.1l., 20 II ).In many r~spects, that thinking blurs the line between agent and fiduciary. In other research on governance, it has 
been assum~d - either implicitly or explicitly - that boards exercise r~latively little independent influence over the flrm's 
strategic dire<tion (Li,lysinger .ltld Hoskis~on. 1990; Johnson et .11 .. 1996; ?..lhr.1 .1Od l'eJrce. 1989). Rath~r than directing 
strategic d~cisions, outside directors art thought to support managers by co-opting finandal institutions, helping to avoid 
hosti le takeov~rs, and perhaps provkl.ing information and expertis~ which aids in th~ implementation of management's 
strategy, without determining the str.1.tegy itself (e.g~ Davis et .11 .. 1994; Mizruchi, 1996). III reviewing this literatur~, 
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) noted that behavioral perspectives on boards have been ~virtually uniform~ in their 
assumption that "boards of directors ar~ not involved in strategy formulation. H 
Clearly, some boards get involved in slTategy making. but the preponderance of evidence supports the position of Fin· 
kelsteln and Hambrick. Thus. if the board's role is primarily one of monitoring and control, and direct beneficial effects on 
strategy are unconfirmed, then the question remains: do interaction effects berween the board and top management team 
(TMT) have an effect on strategy selection within th~ context of monitoring and control7 In this work, w~ theorize about and 
test interactions between top managers and the board, but retain the agency perspective that a key functio n of the board Is 
monitoring and control. Our work is thus based on the premise that managers will seek to benefit themselves at the expens~ 
of possible returns to owners. Therefore, the job of the board is to prevent that from happening by making sure the best 
strategy for shareholders is selected. which may not be the one managers prefer. 
As a baseline, we start by establishing howTMT experience affects strategy selection. We then go on to address the issue of 
interaction by asking whether or not board composition and consequent experience, relative to management experience. 
affects strategy selection. Clearly. this is an issue of managerial risk preference versus board power. so we also take into 
account the separation afCEO and chair roles. What we discover is that interaction effects do occur. The more outsiders there 
are on the board, the more likely it is managers will be pushed away from their comfort zone in strategy selection. The 
implication of this is that board monitoring and control in and of itself is insufficient to protect the interests of the principals. 
Instead, managing the relationship between board structure, leadership structure, and top-management-team experience is 
key to reducing agency problems. 
Background and hypotheses 
Examining interaction effects between the board and TMT is complex. so for the sake of methodological parsimony, we 
elected to focus on the strategy of late movers for our dependent variable. First movers are firms that gain technological 
leadership through radical or architectural innovations; gain control over scarce resources; and/or, manage to lock in cus-
tomers (Lieberman and MontgornelY. 1988). Such game-changing innovations create new industries, or at the least affect the 
structure of an existing industry, as does control over resources and customers. In any case, new or existing competitors end 
up following the leader. like first movers, late movers can use a variety of business level strategies and tactics, but because 
their actions can be explained relative to the actions of first movers, our dependent variable reduces measurement and 
complexity issues. Late-mover strategy is described in terms of a continuum of resources ranging from those that are similar 
to those of first movers (imitation), to those which are different (substitution) (Geletkanycz dnd Hambrick. 1997; Yoo et .11., 
2009). Because of the ability of first movers to attract and secure economic rents. they have been the focus of much research 
attention. Less attention has been paid to the followers, even though they are more numerous. Although the focus of this work 
is on the interaction effects between the board and the TMT, an additional benefit of our research is that it helps redress the 
balance between research on first movers and late movers. In the following discussion. we start by briefly describing late-
mover strategy before gOing on to develop our hypotheses on TMT strategic choice and board effects. 
Late-mover strategies 
First-mover advantage has been described in terms of its drivers (enablers). which include resources and capabilities. 
isolating mechanisms. and environmental factors such as the pace of market and technological evolution (Suarez and 
Lanzolla. 2007). Despite this, some late movers are able to replicate or surpass a first mover's advantage by copying its 
unique practices or technologies, or by finding a more effective or efficient way of organizing and coordinating productive 
activities. Thus, threats to first movers arise from the use of resource imitation and resource substitution by late movers (Yoo 
et .11., 2009). Here. a resource - imitation strategy is defined as the reproduction or copying of a first mover's resources in 
order to duplicate their competencies. For example, Miller's and Coors's brewing skills allowed them to duplicate Rheingold's 
innovation of light beer; and. GE's production skills being comparable to EMl's meant GE was able to imitate and eventually 
overcome EMI's lead in CAT scannerS (Haunschild, 1994; Hunt. 2000: Schn.lafs. 1994). By contrast, a resource - substitution 
strategy is defined as the use of alternative resources to circumvent first-mover competencies. According to Dierickx and Cool 
(1989), a successful resource substitution by late movers will render the original asset stocks of first movers obsolete -
witness Canon's challenge to Xerox as a classic example of resource substitution, when Canon substituted quality-
manufacturing skills for Xerox's extensive technical-service capabilities (Dierickx and Cool. 1989; Porter clnd Ishikura, 
1983; McEvi1y et 01.. 2000). 
TMT external ties and the strategic choice 
The upper-echelons perspective emphasizes the attributes of top managers as a team. because strategic decisions are often 
made and implemented through dynamic processes wherein managers interact, consult and debate with each other (Cyert 
and March. 1963: Daily and Schwenk. 1996; March and Simon. 1958: Gioi.l Jnd Chittipeddi, 1991; Woiceshyn. 2009). The 
perspective begins with the premise that strategic decisions are made under conditions of information overload and am-
biguity. Drawing from behavioral decision-theory, I-iambrid< and Mason (1984) argued that top managers cope with the 
inherent complexity of strategic decision-making by referring to their pre-existing beliefs about appropriate strategic 
behavior, and that these scripts and schemas are shaped by prior experience (Hambrick Jnd Mason, 1984). Furthermore. 
several studies suggest that boundary-spanning activities appear to influence pre-existing beliefs of top management. and 
thus impact the strategic decisions in firms (e.g .• Geletkanycz and Hambrick. 1997: Haunschild. 1993). Research findings have 
shown that the external ties of top managers are an important means by which executives scan their business environment. 
and gain firsthand insight into other organizations' activities. But, in an attempt to economize on information search pro-
cedures, executives tend to rely on established channels to acquire information for insight into plausible alternatives. 
We know that top managers exist in a social world, and that social embedded ness affects the major activities of firms and, 
as some recent research shows. it can have an effect on firm performance (Granovetter. 1988; Geletk.lnvcz and Bovd. 201 It 
Managers can learn to better perceive and interpret. and appreciate more, their organization's task and general environments. 
by interacting with individuals and groups outside the organization to obtain valuable information from the task and general 
environments. They create social capital that is obtained from "cooperative exchanges" between the parties in social net-
works, and thus themselves become a valuable resource to their organization. According to O'Aveni ( 1990), iforganizations or 
society are in the capitalist system. good relationships with outside parties may help organizations establish a competitive 
advantage and perform efficiently (please also see Ad,lIns, 1976: Burt, 1983: Coleman, 1988). 
Information gained in these boundary-spanning activities of top managers may reinforce their existing perspectives or 
may expose them to new ideas and opportunities (Ad.lnlS, 1980; Aldrich and l-ierker, 1977). The key to this distinction is the 
location ofoutside contacts, whether they inhabit the same operating environment or different ones. Contacts who share the 
same operating environment can provide information which helps expand a manager's own knowledge base. By contrast, 
contacts operating in other environments, such as other industries. expose managers to new ideas. Consistent with those 
arguments. different types of external ties of top managers - "intra-industry ties," defined as top managers' boundary-
spanning relations inside their industry. and "extra-industry ties," defined as their boundary-spanning relations outside of 
their industry - have been shown to have different effects on the strategic outcomes of firms. 
The ties to entities within the industry subject top managers of firms to an abundance ofinformation about the successful 
practices common in that industry. Thus, there is a commonality which characterizes the perceptions of managers operating 
within the same industry. In particular, strategic and environmental information drawn from intra-industry sources bears a 
marked similarity to top managers' own knowledge and perceptions of the environment and opportunities within it. Labeling 
these common views "shared recipes," Spender ( 1989) suggested they emerge as a function of managers' similar experiences 
amassed through industry tenure (please also see Schefczyk and Gerpott, 2001). Therefore. per previous work. coupled with 
the homogeniZing influences that emerge in social interaction. we can deduce that strong intra-industry ties of the TMT are 
likely to produce a preference for imitation of the successful market leader in the industry. Using precedent established in 
prior literature on the external ties of top managers (Child <lnd Smith. 1937; Pfeffer and Salandk. 1987). where the total 
number of intra-industry importations (i.e .. hiring top managers from inside the focal industry) and trade association ties (Le., 
top managers' participation in trade organization) are used to measure the degree of intra-industry ties of the TMT, it may be 
expected that: 
Hla: The greater the number of top managers hired from inside the focal industry. the more likely the adoption ofresouree~ 
imitation strategies by late movers. 
H1 b: The greater the number of top managers participating in trade associations. the more likely the adoption of resource~ 
imitation strategies by late movers. 
While ties to entities inside the industry expose top managers oflate movers to the information about first movers, extra-
industry ties (Le .• linkages to entities operating outside of the firm's industry) increase top managers' exposure to information 
that deviates from practices common in the focal industry. Extra-industry contacts do not rely on the same frame of reference. 
As already noted. their views of the environment. business practices. and even goal setting are more likely shaped by different 
experiences and diverge from those in the focal industry. Consequently. extra-industry referents of top managers offer them 
models which expand the range of strategic options. Again. following precedent. we use the total number of extra-industry 
importations (Le.~ hiring top managers from outside the focal industry) and professional association ties (i.e .• top managers' 
participation in professional associations) to represent the extra-industry ties of the TMT. and hypothesize that the TMTs 
extra-industry ties are positively associated with a resource-substitution strategy by late movers: 
H2a: The greater the number oftop managers hired from outside thefoeal industry. the more likely the adoption ofresouree-
substitution strategies by fate movers. 
H2b: The greater the number of top managers participating in professional associations, the more likely the adoption of 
resource~substitution strategies by late movers. 
Board independence and the strategic choice 
A board of directors is a group of individuals elected to represent shareholders' interests via oversight and guidance of 
management (Seward .tlld W,lIsh. 1996). The typical board has a mix of inside and outside directors. "Inside directors" are 
senior employees of the company. such as the CEO. "Outside directors" may be executives of other firms. mainly outside the 
focal industry. or. not untypically. they can be full-time professional directors who hold positions on the boards of several 
companies in various industries. Their views of the environment. business practices, and even goal setting are shaped by 
different experience and are likely to diverge from those prevalent in the focal industry. This heterogeneity in experience and 
knowledge equates to Harrison and Klein's work (2007) on diversity in organizations. where they deduced that. while dif-
ferences in knowledge. experience and information can improve decision quality, creativity and flexibility, they can also 
produce task conflict. They also deduced that differences in position and opinion would reduce cohesiveness and lead to more 
distrust and conflict. In other words, the differences in experience and knowledge between board members and the TMT will 
lead to disagreement. and then, assuming the board is willing to exert power in their monitoring and control function. the 
views of board members will emerge as dominant. Management's preferred strategy will be modified to one that reflects 
outside board members' experience in other industries. and, all else being equal, will then equate to a resource-substitution 
strategy rather than imitation. 
Balance of power in favor of the board has been linked to primacy of the monitoring role, a higher ratio of outside to inside 
directors, and separation of the chair and CEQ roles (Kor. 200(;; Mellahi. 2005; Morek or .11" 1989). Wesrphal and Zajac (1995) 
have shown that relative TMT/board power can predict whose preferences are realized in selecting a successor CEO, while 
Golden .lIld Z<ljJC (2001) have reported that power influences the board's impact on strategic change. Despite the non-
conclusive empirical findings on the performance effects of separating the roles of CEO and chairman. the agency view 
that board independence can be improved by separating CEO and board chairperson duties remains compelling. As argued 
above, boards can modify management's preference on strategy, which is especially true when board members are inde-
pendent of the CEQ's influence (Golden and Z,ljac. 200·1; Westphal and Zajac, 1995). Thus, when board chairperson duty is 
assigned to an outside and independent board member, rather than the CEO, the potential for choosing a strategy of resource 
substitution over resource imitation is enhanced. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H3a: After controllingfor the effects ofTMTs external ties. the ratio ofoutsiders on the board is positively assodated with the 
adoption of resource-substitution strategies by late movers. 
H3b: After controllingfor the effects ofTMrs external des, the separadon ofCEO and board chairperson dudes is posidvely 
assodated with the adoption of resource- substitution strategies by late movers. 
Interaction effects of the TMrs external ties, board independence, and strategic choice 
Central to agency theory is the idea that managers will seek to benefit themselves by securing the maximum number of 
perquisites available. Somewhat less prominent, but equally important. is the idea that managers will select strategies and 
tactics which protect their employment-capital (Fama. 1980). Contrary to the notion of taking actions that produce gains from 
perquisites, protection of employment capital is driven by risk avoidance. whereby managers will prefer to implement safe 
strategies that provide safer but suboptimal returns. like the well-publicized inflation of pay and bonuses which occurred in 
some organizations in the early part of this century. and which resulted in lengthy prison sentences for some executives. 
selecting safe strategies with suboptimal returns is also an agency problem. Therefore. assuming the board is performing its 
monitoring and control duties. it should take action to stop managers from protecting themselves at the expense of the 
principals. 
Reflecting the arguments leading up to Hypotheses 1 and 2. managers will tend to select strategies that fit with their 
experience and knowledge. Thus. for managers with intra-industry experience and connections, they will seek to avoid the 
unknown and reduce risk to their employment capital by adopting a strategy of imitation. whereas managers with experience 
and knowledge from other industries will feel safer with different. resource-substitution strategies. Reflecting the arguments 
leading up to Hypothesis 3. and within the context of monitoring and control, boards which have more outsiders and more 
power likely will question the motives of managers for adopting a given strategy. If the board perceives a motivation of 
protection of managerial employment capital. rather than maximizing returns to shareholders, they should press for a 
modified strategy. Thus. the interaction between board experience. knowledge and power. and managerial experience and 
knowledge. will result in managers who prefer low-risk imitation being encouraged to adopt resource substitution. and those 
who prefer low-risk substitution being encouraged to adopt imitation. All else being equal - such as previous firm per-
formance - we may expect that: 
H4a: For TlWTs with managers hiredfrom inside the/ocal industry. the higher the proportion of outside directors the lower 
will be the tendency of fate movers to adopt resource-imitation strategies. 
H4b: ForTMTs with managers participating in trade associations. the higher the proportion a/outside directors the lower will 
be the tendency of late movers to adopt resource-imitation strategies. 
H5a: For TMTs with managers hired from outside the focal industry, the higher the proportion ofoutside directors the (ower 
will be the tendency of late movers to adopt resource-substitution strategies. 
H5b: For TMTs with managers participating in professional associations. the higher the proportion of outside directors the 
lower will be the tendency of late movers to adopt resource-substitution strategies. 
Methods 
Sample and data 
The empirical setting for this study is the computer-equipment industry. which is characterized by rapid technological and 
managerial change and a highly competitive market. Also. there is a wealth of industry- and firm-specific information which 
allows us to identify the strategic actions of late movers (Angel .1nd Engsrrom, 1995: Lee et .11., 2000; Schoenecker and Cooper. 
1998). We collected data for the years 1986 to 2002. In the mid 80s, the Securities and Exchange Commission proposed that 
the New York Stock Exchange pressure firms to have audit committees made up entirely of outside directors. Consequently. 
Pleasecitetlii"altiC!eiripressits:.Yoo,J.'N~Ried;R.iThe.EffectsofTopManag~~"ntTeain EXtern.alTies.andBoarrl~9Iii"9siti911' 
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the number of independent outsiders in board composition has been rising (Kesner. 1988; Patton and Baker, 1987). The mid-
80s also marked the point at which a stream of significant new product introductions started to occur in the computer 
industry. 
The initial sample. which was comprised of the largest publicly-traded u.s. firms in the computer industrY. was identified 
from the cross-reference volume of Dun and Bradstreet's Reference Book a/Corporate Management; analysts' surveys reported 
in Standard and Poor's Industry Surveys; and, Standard & Poor's Register ofCorporations. Directors and Executives from 1986 to 
2002. yielding an initial sample of 95 firms. large firms typically have well-established governance mechanisms, which 
makes them appropriate for testing the hypotheses in this work. Consistent with observations that Standard Industry 
Classification (SIC) codes are helpful in resolving the problem of industrY boundary definition. our sample was generated by 
identifying firms with primary SIC codes at the 4-digit level. The similarity of the major activities of these firms was confirmed 
by checking Hoover's Handbook ofAmerican Business. and 10-K SEC filings from 1986 to 2002. 
All information for the TMT, including external ties, was drawn from DUn and Bradstreet's Re/erence Book of Corporate 
Management, Standard and Poor's Register 0/Corporations, Directors and Executives, as well as lO-K and Proxy Statements for 
each year of the study period. Per convention, the TMT is defined as all individuals with titles, including senior vice president 
and above (e.g .. president, COO. CEO) (Carpenter ,]Od Fredrickson. 2001: Goll et oJ.. 2001). The average team size was 6.3. The 
data on board composition (i.e., separation of the CEO and board chair position, and the ratio ofoutsiders) were obtained from 
Standard and Poor's Register a/Corporations, Directors, and Executives for each year of the study period. Resource profiles were 
established using data from COMPUSTAT. In the process of merging TMT and resource-profile information, the sample was 
limited to first and late movers which had data available in COMPUSTAT. Because firms went public in different years, and not 
all of them continued to operate through 2002, the sample did not include an equal number of firms for each year. 
Measures 
Dependent variable 
To minimize validity concerns, where possible we have adopted methodologies established and validated in extant 
research. Per existing studies on market-entry strategies, first movers are those firms that introduced a radically new product 
or service which exploited a technological discontinuity. That introduction is a special case of significant and proactive 
innovation by first movers, which has been identified as a source of first-mover advantage. On the other hand, late movers are 
firms that subsequently introduce a competing product or service (Nelson and Winter. 1982: Suarez .lnd L:lIlzolla, 2007: Tellis 
clnd Golder. 1996). 
First and late movers in the computer industry were identified from Predicasts F&S Index United States. Using lexisNexis. 
we first identified all introductions of"pioneering new-product or service categories based on significant innovation" for each 
year of the study period (e.g .• Ferrier and Lee. 2002; Kor. 2003: ZJntollt and Ch.lganti. 1996), The selection of first and late 
movers was confirmed from articles which appeared in the trade or business press, and from industry monographs that 
detailed the history of the industry and also identified new products as innovative and pioneering. Again. this approach is 
consistent with studies on market-entry strategies. There were 30 new-product or selVice innovations by nine first movers 
over the 16-year time span from 1986 to 2001. 
The managers of late-mover firms decide on the extent to which they will deviate from the resource position of the 
industry's first mover. Thus. again following precedent, to measure late mover strategy, the resource deployments of late 
movers were compared to those of first movers. A resource profile closer to that of a first mover indicates a strategy based 
mostly on resource imitation, while a resource profile which is substantially different indicates a greater reliance on a strategy 
of resource substitution. This approach is consistent with the argument that the resource-based view and market-entry 
strategies are conceptually related. It is also consistent with the view that strategy is an observed pattern in an array of 
actions. which is reflected in resource deployments across the key functional activities of marketing, production, R&D and 
finance, It is through this deployment of reSources that firms compete in their industries (HamiJricl,. 1980: Murthi et,]1., 1996). 
Empirical research dealing with strategic choice and TMTs has measured resource deployments in terms of advertising 
intenSity (advertising expense/sales); capital intensity (fixed assets/number of employees); plant and equipment newness 
(net plant and equipment/gross plant and equipment); R&D intensity (R&D expense/sales): overhead efficiency (selling. 
general and administrative expense/sales): and. financial leverage (total debt/equity). Advertising intensity. capital intensity. 
plant and equipment newness, and R&D intensity are all indicators of the allocation and management affirm resources across 
marketing, innovation and capacity-expansion activities: overhead efficiency captures expense structure; and, financial 
leverage reflects an organization's approach to capital management. Together. these ratios provide an overview of a firm's 
competitive profile (Schendel and Patton, 1973). Using these measures we assessed the resource profiles of first and late 
movers for each year of the study period, and calculated the absolute difference of each late mover's scores from each first 
mover's score, after standardizing. Then. following finl<clstein and Hd1T1brick's (1990) methodology, we summed up all 
differences from the six measures to create a single. composite indicator of strategy. 
By using a one-year lagged design. delays betvveen the time when top managers participate in external interactions which 
affect their strategic thinking, and then engage in decision-making activities. are accounted for. Thus, our analysis is designed 
to take into account the effects of the TMT's external ties and board composition at time t on firm strategic-choice at time t + 1. 
Because of this lagged design. strategy was measured up to and including 2002. but the time frame for TMT ties and board 
independence was curtailed at 2001. While a longer time lag can be used (e.g .. a two-year lag). top managers are most likely to 
recall and use information derived from recent interactions (HJvem<lI1. 1992; Virdny et .11., 1992). Additionally. notanly are each 
of the resource dimensions used in this study amenable to change in a relatively short time, but also. in a dynamic competitive 
industry (e.g .• computer equipment), it is unlikely that late movers could afford to wait two years or more. 
Independent variables 
Again following precedent, we rely on the total number of intra-industry importations and trade association ties to 
measure the intra-industry ties of the TMT. Imported top managers bring with them knowledge gained through personal 
experience with other firms' policies and practices. Given that over time their attention becomes increasingly inward~ 
focused, we have adopted Finkelstein Jnd Hambrid,'s ((990) solution, which limited TMT intra-industry importation to 
the previous 10 years and adjusted for recency by making the adjustment (10 - firm tenure at the focal firms)/IO. For example. 
a top manager who had been with the focal firm for six years received an importation score of 0.4. 
Trade associations are established and funded by businesses which operate in a specific industry. Typically, their function 
is to promote standardization across the goods offered, and to advertise and lobby on behalf of businesses in the industry. 
There are over 7000 trade associations in the U.S.. including such groups as The Aluminum Association. The Food and 
Beverage Association, and The Electronics Industries Alliance. Given that trade associations constitute a forum for the 
establishment of industry rules of behavior, they tend to be influenced by the first movers (DiMaggio and Powell. 1983; 
Herman. 1981). Managers involved with trade associations will thus be exposed to the information on and the inf1uences 
of first movers, to their strategies and tactics, and which resources are crucial for success. We therefore used a count of the 
number of trade association in which top managers participated as a measure of intra-industry ties. 
We measured extra-industry importation in the same way as intra-industry importation; that is. a count ofextra-industry 
hires added to the TMT within the previous 10 years. adjusted for recency: (10 - firm tenure at the focal firms)flO. The 
memberships in organizations which draw top managers from diverse industries are primary mechanisms for the exchange 
of unique information among organization leaders. Thus, participation in professional associations has been considered an 
important means by which to gain new ideas and perspectives. Such affiliations allow top managers to interact openly with 
others working in a similar professional capacity (Aldrich and Pfeffer. 1976; Scott, 1985). To measure professional-association 
ties, we counted all top managers' memberships in industry-spanning associations, such as The Conference Board. and 
Business Roundtable, for each year of the study period. Because the number of external ties covaries with top management 
team size, we normalized the data by dividing the number of ties by team size. 
Empirically, it is apparent that there are variations in the classification of board members and the measurement of their 
dependence on the CEO. Daily et at (1999) identified over twenty-five separate operationalizations ofdirector dependence on 
the CEO in the governance literature. However, using the various operationalizations. they could not find support for a Single 
construct that was indicative of director dependence on the CEO. Because of these ambiguities, we use the simpler dual 
classification. consistent with that used in a number of previous studies (e.g., Herln.llin Jnd Weisb<lch. 1991: Molz. 1933). The 
officers of the company who also are directors are considered as inside directors, and all others are assumed to be outside 
directors. Finally, the separation of the CEO and board chair pOSition is measured with a dummy variable which takes the 
value of one. if the CEO of the firm is not the board chair at the same time (SundJrJmurthy er .11.. 1977). 
Control variables 
Because TMT experience is important for strategy fonnulation, we controlled for TMT tenure using the mean number of 
years members of the TMT had spent in the finn. Also. because firms often have different resources and perform differently at 
different stages of development (e.g., startup vs. mature) we also controlled for firm age, measured as the number of years 
since the firm was founded. In addition. we controlled for firm size, measured as the log of total assets, because it has been 
identified in various studies as a factor that impacts strategiC choice (Marlin et .11., 2004). 
We also controlled for the degree of diversification. because managers in diversified firms may have access to ideas from 
their colleagues for which managers in undiversified firms would need extra-industry contacts. We used a Rumeltian (1974) 
approach to measuring diversification: firms with 70% or more of revenues from a single four-digit industry were classified as 
single/dominant. whereas those with less than 70% were classified as diversified. Because of the lagged nature of the 
dependent variable (strategic choice at t + 1). strategy at time t was introduced as an additional control. Such controls are 
necessary when datasets are slow to change over time, or when they may be inf1uenced by unobserved variables (Rume!r, 
1974). Current year control of lagged variables reduces the likelihood of model misspecification (known to generate biased 
and inconsistent estimates) and facilitates better assessment of the effects attributable to the independent variables studied. 
They are also important in clarifying the temporal order of measures, and thus rule out the potential problem of reverse 
causality (Eisenmdnn. 2002; Sanders and Hoivie, 2004). 
Analysis 
The unit of analysis was the firm. The final sample consisted of 724 responses by late movers to the pioneering moves of 
first movers. The hypotheses were tested using mUltiple regression. Given that interaction effects are meaningful only if the 
interaction terms give a significant contribution over and above the direct effects of the independent variables, Hypotheses 4 
and 5 - which posit the interaction effects of the TMrs external ties and board-outsiders ratio on the strategic choices of late 
movers - were tested using a moderated-multiple-regression design. as recommended in the literature (Judge et Jl.. 1982; 
Richey et aI., 2004; Wiklund Jnd Shepherd. 20(3). The data were corrected for autocorrelation by applying the Cochrane-
Orcutt transformation (Kmenta, 1986). Also, the Durbin and Watson (1950, 1951) statistic (1.9) was examined to verify that 
autocorrelation was not a problem. Each of the variables was mean-centered prior to forming the multiplicative term. to 
alleviate any multicollinearity (Aiken Jlld West, 1991: !(ll1ent~l. 1986; W~lsserman and Kutner, 1985). The Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF) and tolerance were examined to verify that multicollinearity was not a problem in the analysis. Finally, plots of 
residuals were examined to confirm the normality of the residuals. 
Results 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations of the study's key variables. l~lb(e 2: reports the coefficient 
estimates for the main and interaction effects of the TMTs' external ties and board composition on the strategic choices of late 
movers at time t + 1. 
The base model includes the control variables. The second model includes both control and main variables. The results 
generally provide support for Hypotheses 1.2. and 3. which posit that there are direct effects of the TMTs external ties and 
board independence on the strategic choices of late movers. Although intra-industry importation was not significantly related 
to late movers' choice of strategy. consistent with expectations. intra-industry ties via participation of top managers in trade 
associations were negatively related to the adoption of a resource-substitution strategy by late movers (13 = -0.098, p < .01). 
Thus. when controlling for organizational factors, we found that top managers' participation in industry trade associations 
intensified the tendency of late movers to choose a resource-imitation strategy over resource substitution. In Hypothesis 2, 
both types of extra-industry ties - those created through the importation of top managers from outside the focal industry 
(Hypothesis 2a). and top managers' participation in general profeSSional associations (Hypothesis 2b) - exhibited positive 
relationships with the choice of a resource-substitution strategy (P = 0.167, P < .001 and P= 0.091. p < .01, respectively). 
Hypothesis 3a posited that the ratio of outsiders on the board was positively associated with the adoption of a resource-
substitution strategy by late movers. as was board independence measured by the separation of the CEO and board-chair 
position. The inclusion of more outsiders on the board did not reveal a significant direct effect on the strategic choice of 
late movers. However. consistent with Hypothesis 3b. the separation of CEO and board chair duties exhibited a positive 
relationship with the choice of a resource-substitution strategy (13 = 0.058. p < .05). 
Two control variables measured at time t had an effect on the strategic choices of late movers at time t + 1. The regression 
results revealed a significant negative relationship (p < .001) between firm size and resource-substitution strategy. which 
implies that the bigger the firm the more likely it is to emulate established industry practice. Strategy at time t was found to be 
positively and significantly related to the strategy at time t + 1 (p < .001). implying that strategic choices of late movers are 
characterized by an inertia - what they have done in the past is what they tend to do in the present. 
Hypotheses 4 and 5 posited that two-way interactions existed in such a way that the strategic choice of top managers 
would be affected by monitoring by outsider-rich boards. Thus, interaction variables were entered into the second regreSSion 
model. Overall. the third model makes a significant contribution over and above the previous model (A R2 = 0.031. P < .001). 
Given that the strategy of late movers was measured according to resource similarity with the first mover (Le .• higher scores 
mean more resource substitution), the expected sign for the interaction terms of intra-industry ties and board outsiders ratio 
is positive (Le., intra-industry ties at t are associated with the adoption of a resource-substitution strategy at time t + 1 when 
the board-outsider ratio is high) while that for extra-industry ties is negative (i.e., extra-industry ties at t are associated with 
the adoption of resource-imitation strategy at time t + 1 when the board-outsider ratio is high). 
Although the board-outsiders ratio did not significantly moderate the relationship between the TMTs participation in 
trade association and strategic choice, the interaction between the number of top managers hired from inside the focal 
Table 1  
Descriptive statistics and pearson correlations~  
Variable Mean S.D. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
I. Strategy (t + 1) 5.64 2.27 
2. Inrraindustry importation 0.07 0.10 0.02 
3. Trade association ties 0.03 0.07 -0.14 -0.16 
4. Exuaindustry importation 0.08 0.13 0.28 -0.13 0.D1 
5. proressional association ties 0.05 0.14 0.22 -0.15 0.07 039 
6. Board ou[siders ratio 0.70 0.21 -0.18 -0.07 -0.01 0.05 0.09 
7. Separate CEO-<hair 0.64 0.48 -0.03 -0.06 -0.09 -0.01 0,03 -0.01 
8. TMT tenure 11.12 5.90 -0.21 -0,48 0.22 -0.31 -0.03 0.11 -0.01 
9. Firm age 32.70 26.68 -0.32 -0.22 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.34 0.21 0.36 
10. Firm size 7.26 1.76 -0.50 -0.17 0.05 -0.21 -0.16 0.31 0.14 0.50 0.48 
11. Strategy (t) 6.04 2.37 0.56 0.04 -0.13 0.13 0.08 -0.17 -0.08 -0.12 -0.29 0.38 
12. Diversification 0.15 0.36 -0.17 -0.22 -0.01 -0.02 0.13 0.20 0.11 0.24 0.44 0.26 -0.13 
d Correlarions greater than .08 are significant at the .05 level; N = 724 
Tolble2 
Effects of (he rrvrrs external ties and board composition on strategic choice (N = 724)d 
Modell Model 2 Model 3 
Intra-industry importation -0.005 -0.592 
( -0.16) (-5.58)"" 
Trade association ties -0.098 -0.191 
(-337)" (-IB2) 
E.xcra-industry importation 0.167 0.495 
(4.98)'" (4.59)"" 
Professional association ties 0.091 0,145 
(2.92)" (1.21 ) 
Board outsiders ratio -0.006 -0.087 
( -021) ( -2.09)' 
Separate CEO-chair 0.058 0.053 
(2.00)" (1.84) 
Intra-industry importation x Oursider ratio 0.621 
(5.80)"" 
Trade association ties x Outsider ratio 0.094 
(0.89) 
Extra-industry importation x Outsider ratio -0.344 
(-3.10)" 
Proressional association ties x Outsider ratio -0.038 
(-031) 
TMT tenure 0,024 0.106 0.125 
(0.70) (2.58)" (3.12)" 
Firm age -0.044 -0.103 -0.112 
(-1.23) ( -2.86)" (-3.16)" 
Firm size -0.319 -0.292 -0.315 
(-8.47)'" (-7.64)"" (-8.24)'" 
Strategy (r) 0.429 0.393 0.358 
(13.65)"" (12.76)'" (t 1.57)"" 
Diversification -0.012 -0.032 -0.008 
(-037) (-1.01 ) (-0.271) 
R' 0,410 0,461 0.492 
F-stadsdc 99.75'" 55.26"· 45.660 " 
JR' 0.051 0,031 
Change in F 11.145··~ 10.856"· 
.p < .05; •• p < .01; ••• p < .001. 
.1 Standardized regression coefficients are reported. T-test results are in parentheses. 
industry and the board outsider ratio was Significant, and in the expected direction. Specifically, a positive significant rela-
tionship (!3 =0.621. P < .001) was observed for the intra-industry importation and the ratio of board outsiders, indicating that 
top managers imported from inside the focal industry opt for a resource-substitution strategy over resource imitation when 
they work with an outsider-rich board. Thus, the results provide support for Hypothesis 4a. Figure 1 is a graphic represen-
tation of this interaction effect. 
The multiple regression results also provide partial support for the moderating effects of board outsiders on the rela-
tionship between the TMTs extra-industry ties and a resource-substitution strategy. The regression coefficient for the 
interaction between the TMTs professional association ties and the ratio of outsiders was not statistically significant at 
conventional levels, but it was in the expected direction. However, as expected in Hypothesis Sa, there existed a significant, 
negative relationship for extra-indus try-importation ties with the ratio of outsiders (P = -0.344. P < .01). This finding implies 
that the tendency of top managers imported from outside the focal industry to adopt a resource - substitution strategy 
changed to a resource-imitation strategy when they work with an outsider-rich board. This interaction effect is illustrated in 
Figure 2. 
Discussion 
We used a multiyear sample of first and late movers in the computer industry to explore the relationship among TMT 
external ties, board composition. and selected strategy in late movers. In the first stage of our analysis on main effects we 
found support for the contention that intra-industry trade-association ties promoted the use of a resource-imitation strategy. 
but our results for hiring managers from inside the industry. although in the predicted direction (Le., a preference for resource 
imitation) were not significant. However. we did find strong support for the prediction that both hiring managers from 
outside the industry and the TMTs participation in professional associations would lead to the adoption of a resource-
substitution strategy. Our findings showed that a simple preponderance of outsiders on the board did not lead to adoption 
of a resource-substitution strategy, but separating the role of CEO and board chair did. Thus. the post-Enron, post-Worldcom. 
post-Rite-Aid calls from the NYSE for separation of roles is valid. Our findings suggest that duality leads to a preference for 
resource imitation. but that separation of the roles frees the board from the dominant influence of an insider chair. 
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Figull! 1. Interaction effect of TMTs inrra·indumy importation ties and board outsider ratio 
This work parallels that of Gelerkanycz and H<1l11brick (1997) and Yao and colleagues (2009) insofar as we examined the 
boundary-spanning activities of executives and how that related to finn outcomes (Geletkanycz ~lnd H<llllbrick, 1997; Yao 
£It <li., 2009). But it also extends those earlier works because it addresses the issue of the effects of board independence 
and board-and-TMT interactions. The second stage ofour analysis revealed that in firms with outsider-rich boards the natural 
inclination of those managers who select a strategy of imitation, and those who prefer a strategy of substitution. is reversed. 
We can thus deduce that the monitoring and control function provided by outsiders reduces agency problems caused by 
managers selecting strategies which favor the protection of their employment capital rather than ones that generate returns 
to stockholders. 
Decision management naturally is the responsibility of senior management, whereas decision control becomes the re-
sponsibility of the board of directors. so in combination they reflect the interactions between the board and top managers. 
Despite this. little effort and attention has been devoted to developing a formal model of the interaction between top 
managers and boards. This study has generated much-needed empirical evidence on the topic. Our work is thus comple-
mentary to the existing body of knowledge on board composition and leadership structure which is core to the literature on 
corporate governance. Our work lends empirical support to the theoretical arguments long made on the importance of having 
a preponderance of outsiders on the board. It also lends empirical support to the idea that separating the roles of CEO and 
board chair is important for board power. By looking at the interaction between the board and the TMT. our analysis also 
confirms the importance of the agency view of governance: monitoring and control is an important task for the board. What 
our work does not do is link this interaction (or the main effects) to subsequent financial perfonnance. Where we have 
focused on governance and strategy. the next obvious step for research is to explore what superior monitoring and control. 
and reduced agency costs. mean for firm performance. 
Because of the potential for statistical noise in our analysis. we selected a parsimonious research design which focused on 
the strategy of late movers. The imitation-substitution continuum that describes late-mover strategy provides a simple but 
powerful mechanism for observing the effects of changes in our independent variables. board composition and leadership 
structure. We can think of no reason why the design should create a boundary condition which restricts our findings to the 
actions of late movers. They should also apply to first movers. However. to verify that the research should be repeated. using 
first-mover strategy as a dependent variable. 
There are two key implications for practice. Firstly, the monitoring-and-control function of the board manifests itself 
through the interaction with the TMT. That is important in the stewardship the board provides for the owners. In particular. as 
the ratio of outside directors to total board members increases. there is a higher probability of the board ensuring that 
managers are taking the risks necessary to provide the best returns for shareholders. Thus, when enlarging the size of the 
board, appointment from outside rather than inside should be the rule. Secondly, in the full model, our results did not reveal 
an interaction effect between board composition and the TMTs external ties on selected strategy. Why that should be so is not 
clear and we hesitate to suggest that these industry ties are not important. Instead, we simply deduce that the hiring ofsenior 
managers and the selecting of board members needs to be done relative to each others' knowledge and experience, rather 
than simply focusing on current contacts. 
Limitations 
Like most research. this study has a number of limitations. First. the use of secondary data means we were unable to 
identify motivations for forming external ties. We assumed a link between external ties and the formulation and imple-
mentation of strategies, but other motivations may exist. For example. boundary spanning can be used for accessing critical 
resources; for interorganizational power: for organizational legitimacy; for organizational learning; as well as organizational 
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Figure 2. Interaction effect ofTMrs extra-industry importation ties and board outsider ratio 
prestige(Galaskiewicz, 1985: Levitt Jnd March. 1988; Pfeffer, 1937; \,rVestphal et .11.. 2006), These motivations may create noise 
in the ties-strategy relationship and thus need addressing in future studies. Secondly. the finer details of social networks. such 
as frequency and strength of interaction in the social ties. were beyond the scope of this work. Finally. we did not control for 
TMT demographic heterogeneity. It has been found thatTMT heterogeneity provides a wider range ofperspectives (Wiersema 
<lnd B,lntel, 1992). In terms of limitations for this work. a wide range of perspectives might have influenced the strategic 
choices ofour sample firms; that is. the more heterogeneous the TMT of late movers. the more likely they would be to choose 
a strategy of resource substitution over resource imitation. 
Conclusion 
The job of the board is to ensure that the owners' interests are being protected. This work has shown that a preponderance 
ofoutsiders on the board is a prerequisite for ensuring that outcome occurs. Also. separating the duties ofCED and chairman 
helps ensure that the board has the power necessary to perform the control part of their monitor-and-control task. Finally, 
despite the extensive array of extant research. it is clear more insights into the interaction between the board and top 
management are required if we are to fully understand how to manage the agency issues which still exist This research has 
helped move us toward that goal. 
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